Corporations - Derivative Suits - Liability of Directors and Strangers Who Acquire Business Opportunities Open to the Corporation by Ryan, Frances M.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 30
Issue 2 September 1946 Article 5
Corporations - Derivative Suits - Liability of
Directors and Strangers Who Acquire Business
Opportunities Open to the Corporation
Frances M. Ryan
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Frances M. Ryan, Corporations - Derivative Suits - Liability of Directors and Strangers Who Acquire Business Opportunities Open to the
Corporation, 30 Marq. L. Rev. 117 (1946).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol30/iss2/5
COMMENTS
CORPORATIONS-DERIVATIVE SUITS-LIABILITY OF DIREC-
TORS AND STRANGERS WHO ACQUIRE BUSINESS
OPPORTUNITIES OPEN TO THE CORPORATION
A number of interesting questions relating to derivative suits against
directors for breach of fiduciary relation, and against strangers to the
corporation, incidentally, have been discussed in a recent case in the
Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York.*
In this case the plaintiff, Craftsman Finance and Mortgage Co.,
was a minority, stockholder of the American Distilling Company, which
in turn owned 50% of the stock of American Spirits, Inc. It brought
an action to require the defendants to account for profits obtained,
and losses sustained by the two corporations, all caused by the de-
fendants' diverting business and business opportunities from the two
corporations. These defendants included the majority stockholders
and directors of American Spirits, Inc. and of American Distilling
Company, the attorney for the two firms, and several strangers to the
corporation who allegedly combined with the officers in their scheme.
The transactions set forth in the complaint were four in number,
and similar in kind. In the first case, referred to in the opinion as
the Ozark Mountain Distilling Co. transaction, the defendant Kessler,
president of American Spirits, Inc., had been sent by one of the
corporations to investigate the advisability of buying out the Ozark
Mountain Distilling Co. He returned with a favorable report. Shortly
thereafter Kessler combined with others of the defendants to buy the
business in question for the benefit of the group. The complaint
further charged that the defendants had since realized large profits
from this enterprise, and had the use of the funds, credit, good
will and trade connections of the American Distilling Company in
carrying on this business. The second transaction, relating to Ben
Burk, Inc., differed in that American Distilling Company had pur-
chased the business and inventory of Ben Burk, and thereafter sold
a forty per cent interest to the defendants, who continued the business
under the name of Foster & Company. In a third charge the facts
set forth that American Distilling had made a large down payment on
the majority stock interest of the Country Distillers Products, Inc.,
which interest was thereafter sold to Foster & Company, and that
the defendants obtained -the money to finance the stock purchase by
inducing customers of the defendant Distilling Company to make ad-
vance payments on future deliveries of liquor, the customers having
been led to believe that they were dealing with Distilling and that
their orders would be filled by that company, when in reality Foster &
Company were acquiring the orders for themselves. It is further
alleged that a contract was then entered into between Distilling and
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Foster & Company for the blending and bottling of certain stocks
acquired by the partnership and for the use of trade names and labels
of the corporation, which contract was not negotiated at arms length,
and was unfair to Distilling. The fourth transaction concerned a
business opportunity of which the individual defendants took ad-
vantage. The complaint did not allege that the corporation had taken
any steps toward acquiring it for itself, although it had knowledge
of the opportunity, and it was through corporate business and records
that the defendants became aware of the possibility of purchase.
Various motions to dismiss were entered by individual defendants;
the first to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action,
and others on the ground that the plaintiff did not have the capacity
to sue: (a) because it had since gone into voluntary dissolution, and
(b) because it was not a stockholder prior to February 25, 1944,
before which time all the transactions complained of had taken place.
With respect to the latter contention, the plaintiff, in May, 1939, owned
twenty-five shares of preferred stock of the American Distilling Com-
pany, which stock was called for redemption as of December 20, 1943,
although plaintiff continued to hold it after that date. On May 8, 1939,
there were issued to plaintiff thirty-three shares of common stock of
American Commercial Alcohol Corporation, which, as a result of a
reorganization plan, were to be exchanged for an equal number of
shares of Distilling stock, and were thereafter at all times exchangeable
for such stock. The plaintiff, however, did not transfer its Commer-
cial stock for that of Distilling, but continued to hold it until December
of 1943, when it placed it in the hands of a broker. Through the
broker its number of shares was reduced to three, evidenced by a
certificate issued by the-American Distilling Company which appeared
to have been issued in the name of the broker. This certificate was
in plaintiff's hands at the time of the commencement of the suit.
There were further motions not of importance in this discuission.
The court held that the complaint stated a cause of action; that
plaintiff had at all times been the equitable owner of stock in the
American Distilling Company, and was, at the commencement of the
suit, the owner of three shares thereof, and competent to bring the
action for the benefit of American Distilling Company, American Spir-
its, Inc., and on behalf of the stockholders of both; that because of
the situation which existed within both corporations, it was not neces-
sary for the plaintiff to make any demands upon the directors of
the two firms; and that although now in the process of liquidating,
the plaintiff corporation still existed under the law for the purposes
of this suit.
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The motions presented to the court in this case raised a number
of important points, which may be divided roughly into two general
questions. The first of these is whether the pleadings set forth a cause
of action, and the second is whether the plaintiff had the capacity
to sue, if such cause existed, and under what conditions it might
bring its suit. This discussion is limited to a consideration of the first
question; and there a further subdivision is necessary, since the suit
was brought against two classes of persons, one group composed of
officers, directors and majority stockholders of the corporations in-
volved, and the other of strangers to the corporations who were also
alleged to have profited by the ventures.
LIABILITY OF THOSE WITHIN THE CORPORATION'
The law places a heavy burden of responsibility upon a director,
predicated upon the fact that he has voluntarily accepted a position
of trust and has taken upon himself the control of property interests
of others. Some writers and courts class him as a trustee, others
as an agent, while a third group attempt to explain his position by
calling him a fiduciary.2 However classed, it still remains true that a
*Craftsman Finance and Mortgage Co. v. Brown, 64 F. Supp. 168 (1945).2 This group included the defendants, Kessler and Siskind, president and vice-
president respectively of American Spirits, Inc., owners of fifty per cent of
the stock of that firm, and members of the board of directors thereof; Roth-
berg, vice-president of Distilling and a director; and Cole and Seymour, di-
rectors of Distilling, the latter also acting as counsel for the corporation.
These defendants were charged both with breaching their trust in failing to
obtain the various companies and assets for the corporations, and with subse-
quently acquiring some or all of them for themselves. Kessler was also active
in Foster & Company, the partnership which took over most of the business
refused by the directors for the corporations. Charged with allowing the fore-
going to carry out their plans without opposition were the remaining directors
of Distilling. The complaint also alleged that this group, or members of it, were
to share secretly in the profits of the transaction, although outwardly they were
to have no active part in it. In this connection the following quotation from
13 Ab. Jur. 946 might be considered: "Directors are not liable for the wrong-
ful acts of their co-directors if they do not connive at them, and if ordinary
care on their part would not have averted the loss; ... On the other hand where
two or more officers join or participate in the wrongful act, they are as a gen-
eral rule jointly and severally liable. It seems, however, that a director is not
severally liable for the act of a majority of the board, although he voted with
it, (italics added); if the directors composing the majority are liable at all,
they are jointly liable." In the light of this statement, it would seem that an
actual sharing in the profits would have to be proved with regard to the last
mentioned group of directors before liability would attach.
2 See "Liability of Directors for Taking Corporate Opportunities, Using Cor-
porate Facilities, or Engaging in a Competing Business," 39 Col. L. Rev. 219
at 225 (1939), where the author points out the discrepancies between the powers
and duties of a true trustee and those of- a director, and inclines toward the
view that the director is most logically classed as an agent. Conversely, see
19 C.J.S. 82: "While powers of director have been regarded as delegated pow-
ers, according to some cases, the powers of the boird of directors are, in a
very'important sense, original and undelegated, and directors do not exercise
delegated authority in the same sense as other agents." In 13 Am. Jur. 966 this
conflict is explained by the statement: "While the courst of law generally treat
the directors as agents, courts of equity treat them as trustees."
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director has been placed in a position where he may be either of
immeasurable value or harm to large groups of people. In determining
whether or not the director has lived up to his trust, three tests
are commonly used; (1) whether he has acted in good faith, (2)
whether he has acted with due care and diligence, and (3) whether
such acts as are being considered lay within the scope of his authority.3
In the instant case the gravamen of the complaint against the
directors is to be found in their non-action. They failed to obtain
or retain for the benefit of the corporations profitable business oppor-
tunities and enterprises, and as individuals, they acquired for them-
selves and benefited by these same enterprises which they had refused
or failed to acquire or hold for the corporations. In passing upon
the liability of the directors in such a situation, the matter of good
faith will be of paramount importance, and it is usually a question
of fact to be determined upon a weighing of the evidence. It is also
true that since the law generally presumes honesty, rather than fraud,
the burden of proving a breach of trust -and lack of good faith will
rest heavily upon the plaintiff.4
With regard to the matter of due care and diligence, more than
evidence is required to reach a decision, as the question of what is
due care in this particular type of case must first be answered. The
majority viewpoint is that a director may use his discretion in good
faith without fear of liability for honest error of judgment. This is
sometimes referred to as the Business Judgment Rule, and when what
is known as "business judgment" is shown to have been exercised,
the courts will not interfere, even though it later develops that the
decision of the board of directors was not a sound one.5
Regardless of the ultimate results of a particular corporate
transaction, all that the law requires is that it shall have been
initiated and consumated honestly and in good faith. In the
management of corporate affairs directors and officers have a
wide measure of discretion. Mere differences of judgment are
not sufficient to warrant equity interference.6
The Business Judgment Rule and the matter of good faith will
play an important role in the final decision in the present case, and
will be of special importance in determining whether the directors
3 13 -Am. Jur. 939. The question of scope of authority is not discussed in con-
nection with the instant case. It was nowhere touched upon in the briefs,
and no doubt failed to arise because of the fact that the acts complained of
were voidable only, and were ratified by virtue of a suit to recover the profits
therefrom.
4 Greer v. Stannard, 85 Mont. 78, 277 Pac. 622,.64 A.L.R. 722 (1929).
5 Uhlman, "The Duty of Corporate Directors to Exercise Business Judgment,"
20 Boston U. L. Rev. 488 (1940). This liberal rule does not apply with regard
to ministerial matters where the agent is held strictly accountable.G.Leslie v. Lorillard, 110-N.Y. 519, 18 N.E. 363 (1888).
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were at fault in not 'obtaining valuable business assets (in the Ozark
Mountain Distilling Co. and the James Sullivan, Inc. transactions),
or in not continuing to hold them (in the Ben Burk, Inc. and the
Country Distillers Products, Inc. cases). Undoubtedly it will be argued
by the defense in the final hearing of the case that it was considered
unwise for the corporations to expand in these directions, and if it
can be shown that such decisions were reached in good faith, this
defense may well release the directors from any liability in later pur-
chasing the property for their individual .uses.1
A further charge against the defendant directors was that they
not only purchased property in which the corporation was interested,
but they engaged in competing enterprises to the detriment of the
corporation. However, such conduct is not forbidden under all circum-
stances. Again good faith is generally made the criterion, or more
definitely:
It is sometimes said that a director may compete 'in good faith',
but this is hot entirely accurate. If a general statement is to
be made, it is more accurate to say that a director may not
engage in a competing business that actually injures the cor-
poration or one which puts a director in a position where he
may, in the future, be tempted to sacrifice corporate gain on
the altar of personal achievement.8
One author places the types of* business opportunities open to a
director in three general categories: (1) those entirely extraneous
to the corporation's business, (2) those in the same or a direct line
with it, and (3) those complementary to it. He further states that
those of the first group will probably not be held to have been
corporate opportunities, although a director might be held liable
for the use of corporate facilities in connection with their development.
Businesses of the third group may or may not be infringements on
the rights of the corporation, depending on the circumstances, while
those of the second group are apt to be. 9 Obviously the situation
in the instant case is one which falls within the scope of this second
group, as the directors in each one of the four transactions engaged in
activities closely related to the charter purposes of the corporations
with which they were originally connected:
7 See "Fiduciary Duty of Officers and Directors Not to Compete with the
Corporation," 54 Har. L. Rev. 1191 at 1192 (1941), where the author states that
such a defense is no longer recognized by some courts, which fear "that thejudgment of those who determined whether the corporation was financially
able to undertake the enterprise was warped by the temptations to act for them-
selves."
s "Liability of Directors for Taking Corporate Opportunities, Using Corporate
Facilities, or Engaging in a Competing Business," 39 Col. L. Rev. 219 at 225,(1939).
9 Iibid. at 220.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
However such classification is not of itself controlling, 0 and many
other factors, as variable as the cases themselves, must be taken
into consideration. A corporation has no right to object to the com-
petition offered by a diretcor in his management of a similar business,
if it has given him permission to enter into that field,"' but he may not
act for himself if he has first been made a special agent of the cor-
poration to acquire for it the opportunity in question.12 He may
not take over an opportunity "necessary for continued corporate exist-
ence or prosperity", 1 3 although directors have been allowed to enter
into the same field of business in cases where the market is almost
unlimited,'4 and under certain restraints.'15 Neither is a director neces-
sarily precluded from a business venture because the corporation has
negotiated for it,'8 although he will be, if it has acquired an "interest"
or "expectancy" therein.'1 The fact that he gained the knowledge
on which he acted through his directorship does not necessarily con-
demn him, although the use of pressure on other directors and the
corporation to divert opportunities to himself,' 8 or the use of cor-
porate funds, customer lists, or good will' 9 may well cause the court
to impress a constructive trust in favor of the parent corporation.
10 Note Greer v. Stannard, Supra, Note 4, in which the court refused to im-
press with a trust certain oil leases which directors of a corporation had ac-
quired, although the corporation was engaged in similar enterprises, and it was
contended that the defendants had learned of this business opportunity through
their official positions. Also Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co. et al,
167 App. Div. 864, 153 N.Y.S. 757 (1915), in which the court declared that a
consulting engineer and general manager had acted in good faith in buying
up property which he had explored for and recommended to the firm for
purchase.
1" 39 Col. L. Rev. 219, Supra, Note 8, at 226.
12 54 Har. L. Rev. 1191, Supra, Note 7. It has been held however that an offiicer
who has merely been sent by the corporation to determine the advisability of
purchasing a business or property is not barred from acquiring it for himself
at a later date on this ground alone. Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co.,
Supra. This point arises in connection with the first transaction complained
of in the principal case. There the defendant Kessler had returned a favorable
report on the Ozark Mountain property, which he had been sent by the cor-
poration to investigate.
1339 Col. L. Rev. 219 at 222, Supra, Note 8.
1' See Barr v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 57 Fed. 86, 6 C.C.A. 260, 17 U.S. App.
124 (1892), in which the court approved the action of directors, who, after
giving notice to the corporation, entered into a similar business in a field where
the demand far exceeded the supply of goods.15 A number of these limitations are listed in Ramsey, "Director's Power to
Compete with His Corporation," 18 Ind. L.J. 293 at 300 (1943).
'
8 Lagarde v. Anniston Lime & Stone Co., 126 Ala. 496, 28 So. 199 (1900).
17 See 39 Col. L.J. 219 at 221, Supra, Note 8, for a discussion of the forms such
an interest may take.
1s 39 Col.L. Rev. 219, Supra, Note 8.
19 Ibid. at 227. It is here suggested that, having taken advantage of the corpora-
tion in such regard, the director might be estopped from setting forth other
defenses which he might have. Similar charges are made against the defendants
in the instant case, in the Ozark Mountain transaction, where they are accused
of making use of the credit, good will, and trade connections of Distilling,
and in the Country Distillers enterprise where they supposedly had access to
the customer lists for their own benefit.
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Applying these considerations to the transactions set forth in the
complaint in the instant case, it seems apparent that a cause of action
against the directors has been stated, although the charges are more
serious in some instances than others." Since the pleadings, on a
motion to dismiss, must be construed in favor of the pleader, it is
evident that the motion was properly denied. On trial, however, the,
task of the plaintiff will be much harder, as is generally the case
when questions of intent, diligence, and good faith are involved.
LIABILITY OF STRANGERS COMBINING WITH DIRECTORS21
The alleged liability of the strangers to the corporation presents
a more difficult problem. The cases are replete with statements that'
an outsider who knowingly combines with a director to aid the latter
in violating his fiduciary relationship to the corporation is liable with
him for the profits made. However very little attempt seems to have
been made to justify this rule.2 In the present case the stranger
defendants formed a partnership with one of the directors charged
with misconduct. However the liability of these defendants does not
seem to rest solely on that relationship. Instead it appears to be based
on a principle of agency that an agent who knowingly and wrongfully
receives money for his principal is jointly and severally liable with
him for such moneys.2 3 It it a little difficult, however, to conceive
of a principal-agent relation in such a situation, where neither party
is subordinate to the other or bound by his directions, and especially
in view of the present case in which the principle is extended to include
the partnership itself as a party defendant. The cases cited in the
brief in support of this liability speak of forcing such defendants to
2 0 Insofar as entering into a competing business is concerned, the Ozark Moun-
tain and the Country Distillers transactions seem to be most serious; probably
because they are combined with a siphoning of corporation assets into the
newly organized firms for the benefit of the individual directors.
21 This group included Foster and Westermann, who were in no way connected
with the corporations. They, together with Kessler, formed the patrnership
of Foster & Company, which took over and made use of most of the oppor-
tunities denied to the corporation. They were active in all the transactions com-
plained of, except that concerning the Ozark Mountain Distilling Company.
22 See Emory v. Parrott, 107 Mass. 95 (1871), in which a stranger united with
an agent of the vendor of property to sell this property at a profit to a cor-
poration in Which the agent of the vendor was also acting as an agent of the
stockholders. Although the court plainly stated that no fiduciary relation existed
between the stranger and the plaintiff stockholders, it held that he was equally
liable with his partner to account for the profits of the transaction. See also
Zinc Carbonate Co. v. First National Bank of Shullsburg, 103 Wis. 125, 79 N.W.
229 (1899), in which the defendant bank was held equally liable with the in-
dividual officers of the plaintiff corporation, Savage and Hayden, in a case in
which these officers combined with the bank, a stranger to the corporation, to
sell to it property which had been grossly overvalued. In this case however
Savage was cashier of the defendant bank. Also Jackson v. Smith, 254 U.S.
586, 41 S.Ct. 200, 65 L.Ed. 418 (1921); Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.
(2d) 121, 2 F. Supp. 971 (1934).
23 2 C.J. 823.
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"disgorge the secret gain"2' and of an equitable action to "charge them
as trustees of their ill-gotten gains",2 5 but no basic reasons are ad-
vanced which would justify the application of such a drastic remedy.
These defendants of themselves had no conncetion with the corpora-
tion, and no liability would attach merely because they competed with
the corporation in obtaining business advantages. Of course they
could not draw on the assets, trade names, and customer lists of the
corporation for their own uses, but the plaintiffs here seek to hold
them liable for more than that.2 6 Certainly the application of the rule
of principle and agent is a strained one, and seems to offer more
protection to the corporation than is justified in the circumstances.
FRANCES M. RYAN
24 Emery v. Parrott, Supra, Note 22.
25 Zinc Carbonate Co. v. The First National Bank of Shullsburg, Supra, Note 22.
26 The prayer for relief in the complaint asks, "That the individual defendants
and each of them and the defendant Foster & Company be required to account
for the profits, benefits and emoluments obtained and secured by them or by
any of them and for the damages and losses sustained by the American
Distilling Company, and American Spirits Inc. by reason of the premises." This
request seems to demand more than merely a return of that portion of the
profits which might be accountable to the use of corporate facilities in the
carrying on of the partnership business. Evidently the plaintiff stockholders
are asking for the whole of the profits on the theory that the partnership has
acquired a business opportunity which the corporation might have had.
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